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Jus Accrescendi
With the Norman conquest and as an element of the
feudal system, which followed, there came into England
the doctrine of ownership by joint tenancy. Under this
tenure each tenant held per my et per tout, by the half and
by all: each had an undivided moiety of the whole, not the
whole of an undivided moiety. A "grand incident" of joint
estates was "survivorship" among the individual tenants,
jus accrescendi, under the theory of which, upon the death
of one, full title remained in the survivors, and, ultimately,
sole ownership in the last survivor. When the tenants,
however, were husband and wife they did not hold jointly,
not per my et per tout, since under common lavi, husband
and wife were one person, could not hold by moieties, per
my, but held per tout. Consequently, neither husband nor
wife could dispose of part without the consent of the other,
and the whole remained to the survivor." This applied to
personal estate, as well as real estate.2
With the growth of liberty and extension of individual
rights of property came the abridgement of the authority
of the sovereign and a modification of the old feudal
tenures. With the great body of the common law, feudal
tenures were brought to the American colonies. Moved
by the freedom acquired through the Revolution and ex-
ercising the new-born security in life and property, the
citizens of the republic soon craved release from the fetters
of European civilization and custom. Early in the life of
'Blackstone, Commentaries, v. 2, 182, 183.
21d. 399; Jack's Ex'rs v. Arnold, 1 Grant 405; Sloan's Estate, 254
Pa. 346, 349, and cases there cited.
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the republic, equity began crowding and modifying the
scope and effectiveness of ancient tenures. In 1812, in the
case of Caines v. Grant, 5 Binney 119, at page 122, Yeates, J.,
speaking for the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, said: "In
ancient times, courts of law favoured joint-tenancies, in
order to prevent the splitting of tenures and services.
1 Wins. 21 * * * * Courts of equity however, had long before
been favourable to tenancies in common, wherever they
could lay hold of any words to construe it so, from its
being a greater equality, a better provision, and preventing
estates from going by accident contrary to the intent".
In the same case, (p. 125), Breckenridge, J. said: "There
would seem to me to be some reason for the right of
survivorship, in the case of joint property, in a personal
chattel, such as a horse or a servant. But whatever reason
there may have been for the principle in the case of real
estate, under feudal tenures, it would seem to be weakened
considerably from what it once was. In England, from
whence we derive our jurisprudence, there has been long a
leaning against it. It is even termed odious; and no won-
der; for that the longest liver should take all, can be reason-
able only where the tenant dying first, has left no issue
to be provided for. But this jus accrescendi, or right of
survivorship, takes place to the exclusion of even immediate
issue, as well as the right of dower".
These expressions indicate the growing tide of senti-
ment against holding by a title so insecure and uncertain
and so obnoxious to a freedom-loving people. The Act of
March 31, 18123 removed from joint estates (trust estates
excepted) the "grand incident" of survivorship. Relative to
the change and the motives impelling it, the remarks of
Tilghman, C. J., in Bambough v. Bambough, 11 S. & R. 191,
192, made in 1824, are pertinent: "The doctrine of survivor-
ship was so little known to people in general, and so ab-
horrent to their feelings, when known, that it was thought
best to get rid of it, at once. The courts had long been
struggling against it, but were unable, without a dangerous
95 Smith 395; Stewart's Digest, Vol. 2, page 2031.
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prostration of established principles, to go as far as they
wished. The aid of the legislature was, therefore, neces-
sary". Since husband and wife can not be joint tenants,
this legislation did not affect the estate held by them. Al-
though they are two natural persons, they are but one
person in law, and, upon the death of either, the survivor
takes no new or additional estate.4 This characteristic of
the estate by entireties has not been removed or modified
by the so-called Married Women's Acts. 5 It still prevails
that neither, without the assent of the other, may abridge
the rights or tenure of the other.
6
It is noteworthy that in Hetzel v. Lincoln, 216 Pa. 60,
it is held,(1) that the Married Women's Act of June 8,
1893,T is not applicable; (2) that, notwithstanding the con-
veyance to husband and wife "jointly", they held by en-
tireties and not "jointly" or in common, and (3) that
"whatever may have been the intention of the husband",
(in conveying to the wife an "undivided one-half"), "the
right of the wife was fixed by the deed from Reed", while,
Blease v. Anderson, 241 Pa. 198, still holding (1) that that
Act "does not abolish or affect estates by entireties * * * *
where the grant expressly or in effect creates such an estate",
decides (2) that "the expressed intention of the grantor to
the contrary" (of, an estate by entireties) does render
operative and effective that Act as to the wife's power to
receive and hold otherwise than as theretofore, and is de-
terminative of the character of the estate held by the hus-
band and wife, grantees. We reach the conclusion, as in-
dicated in Gasner v. Pierce, 286 Pa. 529, 531, that (.1) an
estate by entireties having been established, unity of per-
son of husband and wife still exists, and the so-called Mar-
ried Women's Acts are inapplicable; and the -further con-
clusion (2) that the intent of the grantor, as gathered from
his conveyance, is determinative of the estate held by his
4Stuckey v. Keefe's Ex'rs, 26 Pa. 397.
50'Malley v. O'Malley, 78 Pa. Super. Ct. 10, 13; Gasner v. Pierce,
286 Pa. 529, 531.
6Beihl v. Martin, 236 Pa. 519, 527.
1P. L. 344.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
grantees, and (3) that, an estate other than by entireties
being intended, the said Acts apply.
The rights under this estate are not affected by Na-
tional Bankruptcy Acts8 nor by Federal Inheritance Tax
laws where the estate is recognized by the laws of the
State.9
Where husband and wife hold real estate by entireties,
either may lease, but both are entitled to the rent. Col-
lection by either works an acquittance of the tenant. Each
is under presumed authority to act for the other, and is
accountable to the other for the rents collected. 10
This right to lease and collect is not an incident of the
estate, but arises from such an incident, namely, that the
rent belongs in its entirety to each and not exclusively to
either, and, both being one, either may receive for both."
While joint estates were thus stripped of a distinguish-
ing attribute, jus accrescendi, many have since sought the
benefit of that attribute through the estate by entireties.
Purged of the odium of general applicability, the right of
survivorship was accepted as a desirable attribute to a
title held by husband and wife. Inalienability by one alone,
full protection against debts of individual tenants, avoid-
ance of the necessity of transfer under administration laws,
exemption from State and Federal inheritance taxes, and
a sense of security in title, were elements in the preserva-
tion of this ancient tenure.
It was soon accepted as a safe and comfortable haven
for the husband and wife embarking upon life's journey.
It wds also soon discovered that reckoning must be had
with storms and adverse currents, Under our jurisprud-
ence divorce was recognized. Since the original estate
knew no divorce, it was in no sense affected by divorce,
but continued until the death of either husband or wife.12
8Snowberger v. Hartman, 11 D. & C. 713.
9U. S. v. Prov. Trust Co., Circuit Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit,
No. 4009, decided Oct. 4, 1929.
1OGasner v. Pierce, 286 Pa. 529, 535.
"1O'Malley v. O'Malley, 272 Pa. 528, 532, 533.
12Alles v. Lyon, 216 Pa. 605, 606.
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It now appeared that the estate was more secure than
understood or, in many cases, than desired. To relieve this
locking of title, in the case of divorce, legislation was again
sought. Acts of Assembly followed as follows: May 24,
1923," May 13, 1925,14 and May 10, 1927.15
The reasons enumerated moved others, not husband
and wife, to procure for themselves the same advantages.
What formerly had been an incident to a joint estate, was
now made the object of testamentary disposition and of
contract. In 1854 it was held,'6 as to "jus accrescendi":
"It may cease to exist as an incident, and yet be legally
created as a principal". Under the devise there considered
(to three "as joint tenants and to the survivors and sur-
vivor of them, and the heirs of said survivor") it was held
that survivorship attached to the title under the devise,
not incidentally, but by express grant, and notwithstanding
the Act of 1812.17 In Jones v. Cable, 114 Pa. 586, the devise
was to two sons, "to them as long as they do live, and after
their death to their children". Upon this was based the
ruling that survivorship may arise by necessary implication
from the will. Such necessary implication, however, does
not arise from the fact of a devise to two or more persons,
nominatim.'8 No intendment will be made to establish such
implication, but it must arise fairly from the terms of the
will.'"
To the same purpose, parties sought by contract, what
no longer resulted as incident to joint estates. In Re-
demptorist Fathers v. Lawler, 205 Pa. 24, it was held that
the intent, as revealed by the contract, was determinative
of the right of survivorship, and that the covenant to hold
13p. L. 446.
14p. L. 649.
11p. L. 884.
16Arnold v. Jack's Ex'rs, 24 Pa. 57.
17Semble, see Kerr v. Verner, 66 Pa. 326; McCallum's Estate,
211 Pa. 205.
"8Kennedy's Appeal, 60 Pa. 511, 516; Goldstein v. Hammell, 236
Pa. 305.
19 McVey v. Latta, 4 W. N. C. 524; ,Sturm v. Sawyer, 2 Pa. Super.
Ct. 2S4.
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"as joint tenants and not as tenants in common", sustained
such right. Likewise, where the contract provided "to be
our joint property and become the property of the sur-
vivor. '20 Caroline McIntosh and her niece, each owning
separate real estate, conveyed to a third person, who recon-
veyed all to them as joint tenants with the right of sur-
vivorship. Caroline McIntosh having died, title was held
to have vested in her niece at the date of the deed and
not at the aunt's death.2
Courts have been frequently called upon to determine
ownership of bank deposits and other personal property,
upon claims made under this right of survivorship. The
prospect of burdensome levies upon estates under Federal
and State inheritance tax laws and the constant extension
of the scope of these laws have impelled many to resort
to holding property under a title immune to such levies and
control. The loss or waste of time, the seemingly unwar-
ranted costs of, and the annoying litigation and uncertain-
ties incident to transfers under administration laws, drew
others into the same haven. Many and varied attempts
have followed, intended to hold and pass intact the estate
of the ancestor to the chosen beneficiary and to circumvent
what to them appear to be iniquitous and unwarranted
laws.
Relative to bank deposits and the right of withdrawal
and ownership thereof, the rulings of our courts appear to
have uniformly been: If the deposit stands in the names of
two or more, under an agreement amounting to a bare
power to withdraw, the power terminates at the death of
the grantor, and survivorship does not attach. If, however,
the deposit is subject to an agreement providing, expressly
or by necessary implication, for survivorship, that right
attaches. 22 Under a contract like that in Mardis v. Steen,
with the additional provision that decedent's debts and
funeral expenses be first paid, it was held in Grady v. Sheehan,
256 Pa. 377, the deposit belonged not to decedent's sister,
20 Leach's Estate, 282 Pa. 545.
2lMclntosh's Estate, 289 Pa. 509.
22Mardis v. Steen, 293 Pa. 13.
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whose name it bore, but to decedent's personal representa-
tive. In Flanagan v. Nash, 185 Pa. 41, the deposit stood
in the names of decedent and another and was subject to
the notation "Either to draw". There appeared, though
with no indication of approval or authorization by decedent,
notations as to ownership. Held, the property of the de-
cedent's estate and not of the survivor.
Though decided on another point, Strause's Est., 75 Pa.
Super. Ct. 276, involved a bank deposit in the names of
"Esther M.' Hain or Margaret Strause". Testimony was
submitted establishing a covenant to hold to the survivor
and the deposit was awarded to Margaret Strause. The
deposit was shown to have represented proceeds of real
estate sold by mother, life tenant, and daughter, remainder-
man.
The deposit stood in names of " James - - or Margaret
- - ", brother and sister. James died. Parol evidence of his
declaration as to survivorship was produced. The deposit
was awarded to Margaret.23
Relative to deposits held by entireties, we find:
In Pa. Trust Co. v. Mischik, 96 Pa. Super. Ct. 255, a bank
deposit "In account with Annie, Andrew Mischik, either",
husband and wife, was awarded to the wife, upon the death
of the husband, notwithstanding the husband had deposited
$1200.00, had given his judgment note, assigned the savings
account as collateral, and delivered the pass book. Citing
authorities, the court concluded: "Neither can divest him-
self or herself of any part without in some way infringing
upon the rights of the other. - - - Neither - - had the right
to - - pledge the account for - - debt".
Under authority of Milano, et ux. v. Trust Co., 96 Pa.
Super. Ct. 310, it should be noted that a deposit in the names
of husband and wife, may not be withdrawn, by either,
during the life of the other, in the absence of an agreement
providing for such withdrawal.
Where funds thus held were withdrawn by one and
23Bailey's Estate, 86 Pa. Super Ct. 322.
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bonds purchased, the bonds were held the property of the
survivor. 2'
Certificates of deposit taken by a husband payable to
"himself or wife", at his death were decreed to his widow,
the survivor.
25
Whether the deposit stands to husband and wife, or to
husband or wife, they hold under rights of survivorship. If
or, either may draw in the lifetime of the other, but the
undrawn balance belongs to the survivor.26
"It is an old and well-established maxim that Jus ac-
crescendi inter inercatores locum non habet2 7 This doctrine
has been modified in some jurisdictions, where, as in New
York,28 jus accrescendi is regarded as including a partner's
right to survivorship to goods and chattels of the partner-
ship, at least until the close of liquidation. With us it is
held that the surviving partner "becomes the agent of the
defunct firm for the purpose of disposing of its assets,
paying its debts, and settling it up, and for this purpose the
title to such assets is vested in him - -
Thus we note that the one-time odious tenure, jus
accrescendi, though scored and limited, has again, in answer
to the exigencies of the times, swung back into a position
of usefulness, an effective answer to many demands of
modern legislation.
24Blick v. Cockins, 252 Pa. 56.
25Sloan's Estate, 254 Pa. 346.
26Klenke's Estate, (No. 1), 210 Pa. 572, 574.
27Lindley on Partnership, *340; Rowley on Partnership, sec. 126.
28In re Capria's Estate, 151 N. Y. Supp. 385, 386.
29Shipe's Appeal, 114 Pa. 205, 207; Wainwright v. Marine Nat.
Bank, 72 Pa. Super. Ct. 221.
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